Populism in East Asia

Enhanced and Streamlined Discussion

Introduction

In the academic exploration of East Asian electoral politics, populist politicians and parties appear ubiquitous, spanning from the established democracy of Japan to newer democracies like South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Yet, existing scholarship often falls short of rigorously defining “populism,” relying on lax or inconsistent criteria. This chapter adopts an ideological framework, defining populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that separates society into two antagonistic groups—the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”—and emphasizes the volonté générale (general will) as the rightful guide for politics (Mudde, 2004). Under this lens, true populists are strikingly rare in East Asia.

Unlike Latin America and Europe, East Asia lacks key ideological structures that facilitate populism. The region’s political divides are not rooted in Marxist class theory, nor are post-material values—common in Western democracies—prominent. Consequently, populists in East Asia must rely on unique, country-specific narratives, resulting in rare cases such as Joseph Estrada’s “movie hero” populism in the Philippines, Thaksin Shinawatra’s agrarian populism in Thailand, and Prabowo Subianto’s nationalist populism in Indonesia.

This chapter examines the scarcity of populism in East Asia and the contextual factors shaping these rare examples.

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Why Most “Populism” Collapses

Much of the literature on East Asian populism focuses on politicians as “outsiders” or “mavericks,” showcasing dramatic campaigns and unconventional styles. However, this focus often lacks the key ideological elements of populism:

1. Moral division between “the people” and “the elite.”
2. Homogeneous characterization of both groups.
3. Direct opposition to institutional constraints on the popular will.

Without these, East Asia’s so-called populists fail the definitional test.

For instance:

• Junichiro Koizumi (Japan): Depicted as a “samurai” hero confronting political inertia, Koizumi’s critique of party resistance targeted specific actors, not a homogenous elite.
• Joko Widodo (Indonesia): Celebrated for his humility and “people-centered” politics, Jokowi avoided polarizing anti-elite rhetoric, embodying a “polite populist” approach.
• Roh Moo-hyun (South Korea): Leveraged online movements but focused on specific foreign policy issues, lacking the broad moral critique of elites typical of populism.

In these examples, outsider status and innovative styles substitute for true populist ideology.

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Three Rare Cases of Populism

Despite these challenges, three politicians exemplify distinct subtypes of populism tailored to East Asia’s unique context.

1. Joseph Estrada: Movie Hero Populism

Estrada, a former actor, drew heavily from his cinematic roles as a Robin Hood figure, framing himself as a champion of the poor against the corrupt elite. His campaigns emphasized populist imagery, such as touring impoverished areas in a Jeepney and portraying himself as an outsider to the oligarchic political establishment.

However, Estrada’s policies, such as the Lingap Para sa Mahihirap poverty reduction program, were criticized for being superficial and pork-barrel in nature. His tenure ended in scandal, culminating in a resignation forced by mass protests and military withdrawal of support.

2. Thaksin Shinawatra: Agrarian Populism

Initially a pro-business technocrat, Thaksin transformed into a populist by adopting rural grievances. He positioned himself as a defender of the “moral countryside” against the “immoral city,” integrating debt moratoriums and rural development into his platform. Thaksin’s rhetoric painted rural Thais as the backbone of the nation, contrasting them with corrupt urban elites.

However, his centralized, authoritarian governance alienated key institutions, leading to his removal by a military coup in 2006. Despite his enduring political influence through proxies like his sister Yingluck, populist experiments under Thaksin and Pheu Thai were repeatedly dismantled by Thailand’s entrenched elites.

3. Prabowo Subianto: Nationalist Populism

Prabowo’s populism combined elements of socio-economic and xenophobic populism. Drawing from Indonesia’s anti-colonial narrative, he depicted “the elite” as foreign-aligned exploiters of Indonesian resources. His militaristic campaign style, heavy with nationalist imagery, painted him as a strongman capable of restoring Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Despite his theatrical and symbolic appeals, Prabowo has yet to secure the presidency. His nationalist populism struggles to reconcile Indonesia’s democratic norms with his disdain for liberal institutional frameworks.

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Explaining the Scarcity of Populism

East Asia’s unique ideational context limits the viability of populism. Several factors stand out:

1. Weak Class-Based Politics
   • Unlike Latin America, East Asia’s Left has been historically suppressed, muting class-based discourse. Middle-class movements, rather than labor or peasant movements, drove democratization, reducing the resonance of socioeconomic populism.
2. Lack of Post-Material Values
   • Even in industrialized democracies like Japan and South Korea, traditional communitarian values dominate over individualistic, post-materialist concerns. This leaves little room for right-wing populism to exploit cultural backlash against globalization or progressive elites.
3. Entrenchment of “Good Governance”
   • The “good governance” discourse, emphasizing technocratic efficiency, transparency, and accountability, has frequently countered populism in East Asia. For instance:
     • In the Philippines, Estrada’s theatrical politics clashed with expectations of sober, issue-based governance, precipitating his downfall.
     • In Thailand, Thaksin’s populist style was labeled as cronyism and corruption by the monarchy-aligned establishment, justifying his ouster.
     • In Indonesia, Jokowi’s technocratic pragmatism eclipsed Prabowo’s nationalist populism in the 2014 election.

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Conclusion

Populism in East Asia is a rare and context-dependent phenomenon. The ideological setting—shaped by muted class dynamics, the limited salience of post-material values, and the dominance of “good governance” discourses—creates a challenging environment for populist appeals. Genuine populism has emerged only where politicians could leverage localized narratives, such as Estrada’s cinematic Robin Hood imagery or Thaksin’s moral framing of rural grievances.

Ultimately, East Asia’s case underscores the importance of context in populism’s rise. Unlike Latin America or Europe, where broader ideational frameworks fuel populist mobilization, East Asia reveals the limits of populism in ideationally distinct environments. This comparative insight enriches global understanding of populism’s dynamics and its interaction with democratic consolidation.